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THE NEW LAW OF STANDING:
A PLEA FOR ABANDONMENT
Mark V. Tushnett
Generalizations about standing, we have been told, are largely
worthless.' Yet one generalization can be made without fear of
challenge: the law of standing lacks a rational conceptual framework.2 It is little more than a set of disjointed rules dealing with a
common subject. 3 "Standing" has no meaning unless the particular
doctrines grouped together under that name are identified and
then appropriately applied.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given us no guidelines
for selecting among the rules of standing other than one indicating
that standing has failed as an independent part of constitutional
law. Nevertheless, the thrust of recent Supreme Court decisions is
clear. Decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions on
the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The Court finds
standing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits4 and denies
standing when the claim would be rejected were the merits
reached. 5 The law of standing has thus become a surrogate for
t Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Law School, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A. 1967, Harvard College; J.D., M.A. 1971, Yale University.
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
' See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645,
646 (1973). This Article is concerned solely with constitutional aspects of standing. It will
only occasionally draw on the related body of law that deals with standing to appear before, and seek review of decisions by, administrative agencies. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425
(1974).
4 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) (discussed at text accompanying notes 108-12 infra). In both cases, the controversy
was moot as to the plaintiff representatives of the class, but not as to other members of the
class. The Court found standing because the cases had been presented with concrete adverseness.
5 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (discussed at
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decisions on the merits, 6 providing an especially useful approach
for the Court when a decision on the merits might overturn settled
precedent. One is hard-pressed, however, to understand why the
Court has singled out standing, rather than some other access doctrine, in order to manipulate results. Candor requires that the
Court overrule cases with which it no longer agrees, rather than
avoid those decisions by contriving an artificial rationale to deny
plaintiffs standing. Analytic flaws in standing decisions, then, betoken a deeper problem in the Burger Court: by refusing to confront hard cases honestly, the Court has failed in its task of judicial
review.
The Court's failure to articulate a coherent law of standing has
led to a congeries of rules that are neither reconcilable nor rational. For example, in recent cases the Court has required that
causation be pleaded with particularity to establish standing. Yet
no such particularity has been required in pleading the same causation on the merits of the claim. 7 Other recent opinions state that
standing is a purely statutory question, yet treat the issue as if it
were purely constitutional. 8 In addition, certain opinions fail to
consider the relevance of cases in other areas of law, even though
analysis of those cases would materially advance the discussion of
standing. 9
This Article pursues these doctrinal labyrinths where they
lead. Each doctrine will be discussed independently. The Article
demonstrates the inadequacies of the Court's articulation and application of each rule, and also shows how the new law of standing
leads to conceptual dead ends. For these reasons, the Court should
refrain from disposing of cases on standing grounds and, instead,
should by careful examination salvage the sensible elements of
text accompanying notes 80-85 infra); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See also Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A
Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 480 (1972).
6 The new standing rules are not invoked to avoid decision on the merits, as Professor
Bickel argued prior to recent developments in the law of standing. See A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 117-23 (1962). Rather, the standing doctrines are invoked when
the Court wishes to disguise a decision on the merits by appearing to dispose of the case
on standing grounds.
'Compare Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (in suit
against Secretary of the Treasury, complaint must state causal connection between Internal
Revenue Service policy and hospitals' denial of services to indigents) with Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (in antitrust suit, complaint alleging
indirect effect of defendants' action on interstate commerce stated claim that such action
had substantial effect on interstate commerce). See text accompanying notes 113-38 infra.
'See text accompanying notes 10-112 infra.
9See text accompanying notes 54-68 infra.
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each rule and synthesize the results into a more fully articulated
and precise conceptual framework.
I
THE PROBLEM OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER STANDING

Without recognizing the significance of what it has done, the
Supreme Court has, in the past five years, transformed the law of
standing from a constitutional to a statutory question. 10 A brief
passage in Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast v. Cohen" l furnished the
foundation for the transformation, but the real impetus came from
Justice White's concurring opinion in Trafficante v. MetropolitanLife
Insurance Co. 1 2 Two footnotes in subsequent decisions' 3 marked the
creeping advance of the change, and the Court has recently acknowledged the shift by treating the statutory basis of standing as
too obvious to require defense or explanation.' 4 Yet such a farreaching theoretical shift demands a more clearly articulated justification. Simply stated, the new doctrine rests on the assumption
that Congress may confer standing on parties who otherwise would
not have it? 5 Once Congress' power to confer standing is conceded, all but the easiest constitutional questions disappear, and
standing questions become ordinary problems of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.
A.

The Source of Congress' Power
Three sources of congressional power to confer standing have
been suggested. The first is formalistic and does not advance our
understanding; the second, although sensible, conflicts in some
ways with recent expressions of the Court on related issues; the
third opens the way to a better analysis of standing problems.
1" For example, in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), the
Court explicitly treated the standing problem as one of constitutional dimensions.
11392 U.S. 83, 131-33 (1968).
12 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). Justice White found that absent the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970), petitioners would not have had article III standing.
13O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). These footnotes suggest that Congress, by creating a legal right,
can grant standing to redress invasion of that right.
1 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
15"Otherwise would not have it" is a deceptive phrase. Most plaintiffs proceed under
jurisdictional grants, and the courts must then decide whether Congress, in creating jurisdiction, also intended to confer standing on those particular plaintiffs. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
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1. Standingfor Intended Beneficiaries of Statutory Rights
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
(EKWRO) ,16 Justice Powell reasoned that a congressional grant of
standing created an incidental right to sue to enforce underlying
substantive rights. Thus, infringement of the underlying substantive right gives rise to the right to sue. This formulation capitalizes
on the notion that judicial review is justified as a necessary incident
to the adjudication of "private rights.' 1 7 Unfortunately, in many
standing cases, the "right" Congress created has been solely a right
to sue, wholly divorced from any underlying substantive right,
which makes the argument run in a circle of very small diameter.'"
Three examples illustrate the problem. Under the Freedom of
Information Act' 0 any person whose request for information has
been rejected is permitted to sue in federal court to compel the
government to turn over the information. 20 At first glance, this
looks like the "private right/federal remedy" case par excellence,
but it is not. No common-law analogue to the private right conferred by the Act exists. There is no right to acquire information
independent of the judicial remedy created to enforce that right.
The right to sue and the underlying right to acquire information
are merged in the remedy. We therefore cannot analyze the former in terms of article II121 and the latter in terms of some substantive congressional power; both must be considered solely as
an exercise of Congress' substantive powers.22
A second example is the Clean Air Act, 23 which provides that

"any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf...
against the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection
Agency] where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator. '2 4 The legislative history shows
16426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976).
17 The phrase derives from Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68 (1973). This Article extends Professor Monaghan's argument,
although in a direction that he probably would not travel.
18 See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1968).
19 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
20
Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1, states in pertinent part: "'The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of
the United States . ..."
22 See text accompanying notes 40-47 infra.
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
24 Id. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970).
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that this provision was designed to permit plaintiffs to challenge
administrative inaction without having to demonstrate any injury
in fact.2 5 Thus, the right to sue arises not from any injury to the
plaintiff, but from the plaintiff's "right" to enforce national pollution policy. When the Court was confronted with a citizen suit
26
under the Clean Air Act, it did not mention the standing issue,
even though it reached out to decide the important standing ques27
tion in EKWRO on the same day.
The Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 197428
authorize any qualified voter to bring suit to test the Act's
constitutionality. 2 9 The only right conferred is the right to sue to
have elections regulated in a constitutional manner. A plaintiff who
sues under the Act need allege only the general injury from unconstitutional governmental action.
These three statutes, the constitutionality of which the Court
has not purported to question, confer standing solely to assure that
government officials obey the law. Justice Powell's theory that
Congress can enforce a substantive right by creating an incidental
right to sue fails to explain the use of Congress' power to create a
substantive right that consists solely of the right to sue.
2. Standing as Waiver of Separation of Powers Objections
Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast v. Cohen3" rested on the premise that liberalized rules of standing threatened "the allocation of
authority among the three branches of the Federal Government."' 3 1 Harlan argued, however, that the danger from judicial in2 See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1976); Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 723-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (legislative history
reprinted and discussed). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act has a citizen suit provision (33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975)), which, although modeled on the Clean Air
Act, differs in that it defines "citizen" as a person who has "an interest which is or may be
adversely affected" (id. § 1365(g)). The conditional verb indicates, however, that no substantial limitation is imposed. In Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act citizen suit provision as if it reproduced that of the Clean Air Act. 510 F.2d at 699.
26
See generally Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1
(1976).
27 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
Is Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amending scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47
U.S.C.).
29 The pertinent part of 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides that "any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President of the United States may
institute such actions . . . as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any
provision of this Act." The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976),
noted this provision, but did not comment on its constitutionality.
30 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
31 Id. at 130.
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trusion into legislative or executive matters decreased when Congress passed, and the President signed, the law authorizing the
32
intrusion.
Harlan's argument derives force from the theory of Congress'
plenary power enunciated in Gibbons v. Ogden.33 Plenary power by
definition contains no internal limitations. For example, once it is
decided that some subject is reasonably related to interstate commerce, Congress may regulate under the commerce clause; courts
need not determine whether the subject regulated "directly" affects
interstate commerce or whether the subject is in some "stream of
commerce" with definable terminal points. Congress' power, however, is not unlimited. Apart from specific limitations such as the
first amendment, there are what Professor Wechsler called the "political safeguards" against legislative action that would seriously
reallocate power in the government. 34 Congress is unlikely to grant
courts powers that might infringe upon congressional prerogatives,
unless it believes the grant is necessary to serve an important
public policy.
Justice Harlan's argument provides a useful analytical framework for examining standing questions, and is consistent with
the "settled" constitutional principles of plenary congressional power. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has recently questioned the
plenary power theory. National League of Cities v. Usery 35 involved
the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act3 6 to state and local
governments. The Court found that principles of federalism restricted the exercise of congressional power under the commerce
clause. The Court explicitly rejected Justice Brennan's dissenting
argument, 3 7 based on Gibbons, that federalism values were protected by state representation in Congress.3 8 In rejecting the Gibbons analysis, the majority drew support from cases that are directly
relevant to the argument here. The Court cited two cases in which
congressional restrictions on the President's appointment power
had been held unconstitutional, even though the President had
32

Id. at 132.
33 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Gibbons Court noted: "This power [to regulate
interstate commerce], like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the
Constitution." Id.

at 196. See generally C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

19-38 (1963).
31 H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961).
35 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

36 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
31 426 U.S. at 876-78.
38
1d. at 841 n. 12.
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arguably acceded to the restriction by signing the bills.3 9 Citing
these cases, the Court concluded that participating in the enactment of statutes does not waive constitutional objections based
upon separation of powers and, by analogy, upon federalism.
Justice Harlan's argument can be refined in light of National
League of Cities. Statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act have two
components: a substantive rule of law, about which there may be
constitutional doubt, and an authorization to the federal courts to
adjudicate the constitutional question. Congress and the President
may agree to submit any controversy concerning their respective
powers to the courts by conferring standing. For example, by signing a bill, a President does not waive any constitutional objection to
a legislative enactment if the bill also confers standing to challenge
the enactment; rather, the Executive merely indicates a willingness
to submit a controversy to the courts. Thus, an express statutory
grant of standing does not result in a "waiver" of substantive rights
held by Congress, the Executive, or the states.
This refinement of Harlan's analysis is a bit contrived, and
unlike his original argument, is not rooted in a well developed
tradition of constitutional law. The central insights of the argument can be preserved, however, upon consideration of the final
ground for congressional power to confer standing.
3. Standing and the Necessary and ProperClause
In his concurrence to Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,40 Justice White claimed that Congress could extend standing
when the Court would deny it. In support of his claim Justice
White cited Katzenbach v. Morgan,4 1 in which the Court held that
Congress, in exercising its power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment, could prohibit the use of literacy tests for voting, even
though the Court was not prepared to hold that the use of such
tests would violate the equal protection clause absent congressional
action. According to one interpretation, the case upheld the power
of Congress to make a factual determination that the use of literacy
tests by the states promoted violations of fourteenth amendment
rights. Thus, it is argued, although literacy tests did not themselves
violate the Constitution, and although Congress did not have the
power to declare that they did, the enforcement clause of the four39Id., citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976).
40409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
41384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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teenth amendment allowed Congress to conclude that elimination
of literacy tests was necessary to protect rights clearly guaranteed
42
by the amendment.
This straightforward application of the necessary and proper
clause 43 can be extended to the standing context: Congress, in exercising some enumerated power, may take substantive action and
also grant liberal standing as a necessary and proper means of
guaranteeing the effectiveness of that action. 44 For example, Congress passed the Clean Air Act pursuant to the commerce power,
and chose to extend standing to all citizens 4 5 as a necessary and
proper means of securing the benefits conferred by the Act. 46 Justice White's theory reduces all standing questions to matters of
statutory interpretation. 47 A court need only examine the statute
conferring the substantive right and/or the right to sue to determine if Congress intended a particular plaintiff to have standing.
In addition, Justice White's theory would allow application of the
liberal canons of statutory interpretation appropriate to review of
congressional action taken under the necessary and proper clause.
Under Justice Harlan's waiver theory, stricter canons of interpretation would apply.
B. Problems of Statutory Interpretation
Plaintiffs bring suits under three types of statutes: those that
explicitly grant standing to a wide class of plaintiffs, general
42

See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 101-03,

110. My interpretation of Katzenbach v. Morgan is a very weak reading of the case; Professor Burt outlines stronger ones. He argues, for instance, that the Court may have relied on
Congress' fact-finding capacity to justify its deference to Congress, or it may have recognized Congress' independent power to declare state action violative of the fourteenth
amendment.
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
44 Under this interpretation of congressional power, in order to claim standing a person need not be in the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision
upon which he or she relies. Congress decides whether to limit the power to initiate review
to persons in a particular statute's zone of interests in light of its evaluation of how to best
serve the underlying policy of the statute. Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (standing found where petitioners were arguably within
zone of interests protected by statute).
45 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970).
46 Congress' power to confer standing as a means of giving effect to legislation resting
on an enumerated power avoids problems that arise from broader readings of Katzenbach
v. Morgan and from Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
generally Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1376-77.
47 Some courts are unaware of the statutory problem, while others are sensitive to it.
Compare Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589-98 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc) with id. at 598-99
(concurring opinion, Mansfield, J.) and White v. Arlen Realty Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645
(4th Cir. 1975).
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jurisdictional statutes, and statutes that grant standing
to "injured"
parties without defining what constitutes an injury. 48 The citizens'
suit provisions of the Clean Air Act49 and the Freedom of Information Act5" illustrate the first type. These statutes present few
problems; to find standing, a court need only determine that the
statutory grant of standing was a necessary and proper means for
carrying out a constitutional legislative end 51-a standard easily
met by potential plaintiffs.
Claims of standing under general jurisdictional grants such as
28 U.S.C. § 133 1,52 the general federal question provision, and 28
U.S.C. § 1361, 53 the mandamus provision, present more complicated questions. Here, a two-part analysis is necessary. First, because Congress did not focus on questions of separation of powers
when it adopted these provisions, there has been no considered
congressional determination that potential intrusions on separation
of powers are justified by the need for judicial decision of particular constitutional claims. Thus, the general jurisdictional grants
should not be construed to confer standing ex proprio vigore. However, general grants can be invoked only upon a claim that statutory or constitutional rights have been violated. Thus, courts must
take a second analytical step and determine whether standing
ought to be inferred from the right invoked.
The Supreme Court has already provided a framework for
this second step. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 54 the Court
held that a person proceeding under federal question jurisdiction
could recover money damages in federal courts from federal
55
agents who had violated his or her fourth amendment rights.
The Court noted that a remedy was necessary to protect citizens
from violations of their fourth amendment rights. 56 The Court
48 Statutory and nonstatutory review are sometimes distinguished in this context. See,

e.g., Albert, supra note 3, at 429; Scott, supra note 3, at 647-48; Note, Standing, Separation of
Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 835 (1975).
4942 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970).
505 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975).
51McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
52 28 U.S.G.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1977).
5328 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
54403 U.S. 388 (1971).
55In Bivens, the plaintiff claimed that an amount in excess of $10,000 was in controversy. Congress has since amended the federal question provision to eliminate the
amount-in-controversy requirement in actions against the United States or its agents
acting in their official capacity. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)).
56 403 U.S. at 397. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1533, 1549-52 (1972) (standard ought to be "whether there are
other remedies available to those in the plaintiff's position that would as fully effectuate
the purposes of the constitutional guarantee as the remedy sought").
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relied on cases in which litigants had claimed that private rights
of action ought to be inferred from a statutory scheme.5 7 It should
be emphasized that this is not an article III problem, but rather a
"simple" problem of interpreting particular constitutional provisions. For example, if taxpayer suits are an appropriate mechanism
for enforcing rights protected by the establishment clause of the
first amendment, then standing is conferred by that clause; article
III is irrelevant to this stage of the analysis.
The law relating to private rights of action also helps in analyzing the final group of statutes-those that grant an "injured party"
58
standing, yet fail to specify what constitutes an actionable injury.
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 59 involved such a statute. The 1968 Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ny person who
claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice"
may sue in federal court to enforce the rights protected by the
Act." The plaintiffs in Trafficante were tenants of a housing project
that allegedly discriminated against nonwhite applicants for apartments. Plaintiffs claimed that they were denied the social benefits
and professional advantages of living in an integrated community.
The Court held that, given the widespread discriminatory practices
and the inadequacy of the government's enforcement efforts, 6 1 private actions were an appropriate devike for enforcing the statutory
right.
Trafficante can be profitably compared with Cort v. Ash, 62 another "private right of action" case, in which shareholders sought
a federal remedy in order to recover illegal campaign contributions
made by their corporation. In Cort the Supreme Court stated:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First ... does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
U.S. at 396-97.
" See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL

17 403

COURTS 56 (2d ed. 1975).
409 U.S. 205 (1972).
6" 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), (d) (1970). Suit may not be brought, however, if the complainant fails to exhaust the administrative procedures established by the Act, or if judicial
remedies "substantially equivalent" to those provided by the Act are available under state
or local law. See id. § 3610(a)-(d).
61 409 U.S. at 210-11.
62 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
-1
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state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on
63
federal law?
In Trafficante, the Court found indications in the legislative history
that "the whole community" was the victim of discriminatory housing practices and had rights under the statute. 64 It noted that practical limitations on public enforcement supported an inference that
Congress intended to permit suit by private parties. 65 The Court
allowed the plaintiffs to sue and concluded that the suit would not
interfere with any purposes of the legislative scheme. 6 6 Nothing is
gained by labeling Trafficante a standing case; the precedents on
which the Court relied emanated from a different area of the law.
Trafficante simply decided that the plaintiffs had stated a claim
67
upon which relief could be granted.
The Court has never clearly recognized the relationship between standing cases and "private right of action" cases. 68 Problems
arise when a private right of action is clearly available for a certain
class of persons, but it is unclear whether the particular plaintiff is
a member of that class. Although the precise issue addressed by
cases such as Cort v. Ash is not of central concern here, those cases
furnish a useful analytic framework.
The primary concern here is with actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.69 The leading case
is O'Shea v. Littleton,7 11 where the plaintiffs launched a full-scale attack on the administration of criminal justice in Cairo, Illinois. The
plaintiffs were residents of Cairo who had been criminal defendants or suspects. They claimed that city magistrates habitually set
bond and imposed sentences in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner. In an opinion that commingled considerations of
standing, mootness, and want of equity, the Court concluded that
the plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege an article III case or
71
controversy.
63 Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
64 409 U.S. at 211.
65
1d. at 210-11.
66

Id. at 211.
67 See text accompanying notes 113-38 infra.
68

See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1975). In Warth the Court noted the
tenuous relationship between the alleged discriminatory actions of the respondents and the
injury the taxpayer-petitioners claimed that they had sustained, and concluded that no
statutory or constitutional provision could be construed to grant standing.
69 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
70414 U.S. 488 (1974).
71 Id. at 493.
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The Court's opinion in O'Shea provides a textbook example of
the inappropriate use of standing as a ban to action where other
doctrines would have provided adequate bases for dismissal. It was
inappropriate to rely, even in part, on standing grounds because
the action was based on section 1983, which creates a right of
action for parties "injured" by unconstitutional actions of state officials. The Court should have focused on the requisites of an
actionable "injury" under section 1983 and should have relied on
"private right of action" cases. Examining the case in light of the
four factors singled out in Cort, one finds that section 1983 was
designed to protect against racially discriminatory action and was
intended to displace more limited state law. This follows from
Monroe v. Pape72 and Mitchum v. Foster.73 In Mitchum the Court canvassed the history of the statute and found a legislative intent to
provide "a uniquely federal remedy" against actions by state
officers, 74 including actions by judges in their official capacities. 75
The Court in O'Shea adverted to the "private right of action"
criteria only indirectly. It emphasized the plaintiffs' failure to
demonstrate that Illinois' appellate courts would have denied them
relief if they had proved their allegations, 76 and noted the availability of an alternative remedy for the alleged violations, such as federal criminal prosecutions of the defendants for violating the plaintiffs' civil rights.7 7 These points were made in a discussion of the
propriety of granting injunctive relief. However, consideration of
the appropriateness of such relief was linked by the O'Shea Court
to the question of whether a federal right or remedy existed at
all, a result clearly inconsistent with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, where the Court rejected the argument that federal remedies should be inferred only when state remedies are inade78
quate.
The O'Shea Court's hasty resort to the Constitution to bar the
suit when traditional, nonconstitutional doctrines would have
72 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

73 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
74
Id. at 239.
7mId. at 240-42. The Mitchum Court noted: "It is clear from the legislative debates
surrounding passage of § 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'against State action . . . whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial."' 407 U.S. at 240, quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1880) (emphasis in original).
76 414 U.S. at 502 (1974).
77
1 d. at 503.
78 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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served as well-and indeed were relied on in the course of the
constitutional discussion-strikingly illustrates the Court's muddled
79
analysis of standing cases.
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
(EKWRO) 80 the Supreme Court again rushed to the Constitution
when nonconstitutional doctrines would have served as well.8 1 The
plaintiffs, members of the EKWRO, sought declaratory and injunc82
tive relief from an Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling.
They claimed that the Ruling violated the Internal Revenue Code
by granting favorable treatment to hospitals that provided only
limited service to indigents. A suit by one person, challenging
another's tax liability, is extraordinary, 83 and the case could have
84
been disposed of on this ground alone. Under the Cort standards,
to imply a remedy here would have been inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the scheme of tax administration. Justice
Stewart alone suggested this analysis, but related it to the standing
question, and not to the question of whether the plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action: "I cannot now imagine a case, at least
outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax
liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the
federal tax liability of someone else."'8 5 Justice Stewart's reference
to standing is particularly unfortunate given the Court's present
79The injunction sought would have called for ongoing federal supervision of the
day-to-day operations of the Cairo, Illinois, criminal justice system. Thus, principles of
comity and federalism provided a sufficient basis for barring the suit. Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). The Court in O'Shea relied on such considerations in its discussion of both constitutional and nonconstitutional principles. 414 U.S. at 498-502. See also
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975). Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy available
only when other remedies are inadequate. See Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 471, 595-98 (2d Cir.
1975) (en banc); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 617-22
(1976) (equitable remedy inappropriate). See also Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1393. Sensible
application of this traditional equitable principle in O'Shea would have yielded the same result without reaching unnecessary constitutional issues.
80 426 U.S. 26 (1976).

81See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion, Bran-

deis, J.).
82 Rev. Rul. 545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
83
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7421(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36 (1976). But see I.R.C. § 7426(a). For further discussion of statutory limitations on the ability of one taxpayer to secure a determination of another's tax
liability, see Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 56-58 (1972); Note, Nontaxpayer Challenges to Internal Revenue
Service Rulemaking: Constitutionaland Statutory Barriers to Judicial Review, 63 GEO. L.J. 1263,
1283-97 (1975); Note, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 GEO. L.J. 747, 771-78 (1973).
84 422 U.S. at 78.

85426 U.S. at 46 (concurring opinion).
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confusion over the relationship between the constitutional and the
statutory aspects of standing.
86
EKWRO arose under the Administrative Procedure Act,
which grants judicial review to persons "aggrieved by agency
action. 8 7T As interpreted in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,88 the Act requires that plaintiffs show that
they were injured in fact by agency action and that their interest
arguably lies within the zone of interests protected by the statute
under which the agency acted. The constitutional requirement of
"injury in fact" declared in Data Processing and EKWRO has little
connection with the policies underlying standing rules. Indeed, if
citizens are injured in fact by violations of the Clean Air Act or the
Federal Elections Campaign Act, it is hard to see what special content the "injury in fact" requirement adds to the "zone of injury"
test. The better view of Data Processing would regard both requirements as statutory, resting on a determination that Congress generally intends to grant standing to those persons best able to enforce the statute. Fortunately, the Court has never disqualified a
plaintiff for failure to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement;8 9 in
fact, the Court has not given the concept much content at all. The
requirement, however, has the potential to create future mischief.
The Court disposed of the EKWRO plaintiffs on constitutional-standing cum pleading grounds. But before examining the
Court's recent attempts to inject civil procedure into standing
cases, 9 ° the constitutional limitations on Congress' power to confer
standing should be considered, since at least two Justices believe
that the Court, by requiring plaintiffs to allege "palpable injury,"
has limited that congressional power. 9 1 This Article has demonstrated that Congress has the power to confer standing where citizen suits are appropriate ways to enforce substantive rights. 92
Nonetheless, there may be limitations on Congress' power.

865 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1970).
87
Id. § 702.
88 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
89 See D. CURRIE, supra note 58, at 57-58.

9oSee notes 113-38 and accompanying text infra.
91The dissenters in EKWRO were responding to the phrase "distinct and palpable
injury," as used by the Court in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 426 U.S. at
64-66 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). EKWRO exemplifies
the thoughtless use of a catchphrase which is inappropriate in the context of such statutes
as the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. V 1975). See note 29
and accompanying text supra.
92See text accompanying notes 16-29, 41-47 supra.
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C. Limitations on the Power to Confer Standing
In Trafficante, Justice White argued that Congress could not
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to issue advisory opinions, 93 and Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast v. Cohen 94 advised that
"[tlhe difficult case" of Muskrat v. United States95 imposed constitutional limits on Congress' power. 96 However, those limits are exceedingly broad, and in the modern context will rarely be transgressed.
Objections to advisory opinions fall into several groups. Pure
advisory opinions may be issued without adversary presentation, as
when President Jefferson asked the Supreme Court to outline the
law of neutrality. 97 In addition, advisory opinions may be sought
before the facts of a case have been fully developed, they may
prematurely foreclose action that might later be permitted, and
they may permit the legislature to avoid considering the constitutionality of its actions. Finally, advisory opinions cannot be "cases"
under article III because no enforceable judgment results. 98
The force of most of these objections was seriously diminished
when the Declaratory Judgment Act9 9 was upheld against constitutional attack. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth'"" the Court
held that article III case or controversy requirements are satisfied
if a court must decide the claims of truly adversary parties and the
controversy involves a fully developed factual setting. Justice
Brennan has defined this requirement as one of "concrete adverseness.""" No recent standing case has involved a challenge to
actions not yet taken. Nevertheless, doctrines of ripeness could be
1 2
used to dispose of premature challenges. 0
Because the Supreme Court's reasoning in Muskrat v. United
States "' is obscure, it is difficult to define the limitations that case
93409
94392
95219
96392
97See
(1891).

U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
U.S. 83 (1968).
U.S. 346 (1911).
U.S. at 132 n.21.
3 H. JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 487-89

9'See H. HART. & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
66-67 (2d. ed. 1973) (detailed enumeration of reasons for avoiding advisory opinions).
9928 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1970).
300 U.S. 227 (1937).
191 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 56 (1976).
102 The ripeness doctrine was described in Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
158, 164 (1967): "[T]he test of ripeness .. . depends not only on how adequately a court
can deal with the legal issue presented, but also on the degree and nature of the
[challenged] regulation's present effect on those seeking relief."
103 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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imposed on Congress' power to confer standing. In Muskrat, Congress had authorized four Indians to seek a declaration, on their
own behalf and on behalf of other Cherokees,' 0 4 determining the
constitutionality of a law affecting Cherokee property. 10 5 If the law
affecting Cherokee property had been held unconstitutional, the
United States would have paid the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees out of a
trust fund established to aid the Cherokees. 0 6 The Court held that
article III barred the federal courts from adjudicating the suit.
Two points may be made about Muskrat. First, the light retrospectively cast by Haworth shows that the declaratory judgment aspect
of the case is irrelevant. Second, in a parallel proceeding brought
under the general jurisdictional statutes, one of the parties singled
out by Congress to bring suit secured a determination of the law's
constitutionality. t 7 Thus, at least one of the designated plaintiffs
had interests sufficiently adverse to those of the United States to
satisfy article III. Muskrat apparently holds only that Congress cannot decide the adverseness of parties prospectively; such determinations must be left to the courts.
The proposition that the Constitution requires no more than a
retrospective judicial evaluation that a case has been presented with
sufficient concreteness by truly adverse parties finds support in
Sosna v. Iowa.""s Sosna sought injunctive and declaratory relief to
prevent Iowa from enforcing a one-year residency requirement for
divorce. The suit was certified as a class action on behalf of bona
fide Iowa residents who desired divorces but could not obtain them
because of the requirement. After judgment in the district court,
but before disposition in the Supreme Court, Sosna had satisfied
the Iowa residency requirement but had obtained a divorce outside of the state. Nonetheless, the Court held that it could reach
the merits of Sosna's claim because "the interests of [the] class have
been competently urged at each level of the proceeding ....
104Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028.
105 Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, as amended by Act of June 21, 1906, ch.

3504, 34 Stat. 325 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
1 6 Similarly, by requiring the court to award the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, Congress
eliminated judicial discretion, which has been preserved even under statutes that make
awards of attorneys' fees generally available. See, e.g., Bradlqy v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696
(1974). That the United States would have paid the fees of both parties, as the Indians'
trustee and as defendant in the suit, would seem irrelevant in light of its fiduciary duties to
the Indians.
1'l7 Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912).
"Is419 U.S. 393 (1975).
'0 Id. at 403. See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1976).
The Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226 (1974),
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Sosna's complaint presented a concrete example of the operation
of the challenged residency requirement, thus eliminating any possibility of deciding the case on incompletely developed facts. Retrospective evaluation""1 of the adverseness of the proceeding
eliminated any fears of collusion or of lack of diligence in litigating
the claim.
D.

Summary
Sosna by its terms is a mootness case, but it can as easily be
characterized as a standing case. Arguably, Sosna lacked standing
to present the claims of those who, unlike her, were actually disadvantaged by the residency requirement."' By providing for class
actions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress conferred standing on Sosna, who, absent congressional action, would
not have been allowed to litigate the underlying substantive issues.
The Sosna Court held that a retrospective determination that a case
has been litigated in a concrete setting allows a court to reach the
merits of a controversy. Article III seems to require no more.
stated that "[a] logical corollary to this approach would be the manifestly untenable view
that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for
denying standing." In light of the requirements of the class action rules regarding adequacy of representation, it is hard to see why reliance on the adequacy of representation
for standing purposes is manifestly untenable. Consider the following problem: assume
that a lawsuit has been filed by a person who seeks designation as the representative of a
class, and that the claim satisfies the requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that it be typical of claims of other members of the class. Before the district
court acts on the request to designate, the plaintiff's claim is mooted. The Court in Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), suggested that in some circumstances the designation might
relate back to a time before the claim became moot. Id. at 402 n. 11. Clearly, one ground
for refusing to allow relation back would be the inadequacy of representation. In this
situation, inadequacy of representation would preclude even adjudication of the individual
claim on the merits. See generally Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 430 (1973); Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573.
110The term retrospective here means evaluated as of the time that the individual
claim becomes moot. This may occur quite early in the litigation. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 398 (1975). Thus, the Court may base its evaluation on preliminary papers filed
by the plaintiff, and this evaluation may actually constitute an informed prediction about
the probability of adequate representation in later aspects of the case.
111 Thus, it is not surprising that in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), the Court drew freely from mootness and standing precedents in analyzing a class
action problem similar to that in Sosna.
Analytically, the Sosna problem may be considered similar to one in which a third
party, formerly affected by the statute involved, seeks to assert the rights of persons not
before the court but who are presently affected by the statute. The Court has treated such
problems as involving considerations of prudence but not constitutional requirements. See,
e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976). See also Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1384
("Mootness is ... the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.").
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Thus, standing in its pure article III form imposes only a very
minor limitation on the availability of a federal forum, given the
realities of constitutional litigation. If Sosna states the article III
limitations on standing, then only occasional pro se suits presenting
facially outrageous claims" 2 would be constitutionally barred from
the courts. This result would render superfluous much of the Supreme Court's careful construction of a constitutional basis for
standing. A full-scale analysis of the relation between the constitutional rule of standing and congressional power to confer standing
is needed. The Court has not taken the time to develop such an
analysis.
II
THE PROBLEM OF PLEADING IN STANDING CASES

In two recent "standing" cases the Supreme Court imposed
stringent pleading requirements on the complaining plaintiff.
Warth v. Seldin 1 3 was an attack on exclusionary zoning in a suburb
of Rochester, New York. The Court held that none of the named
plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the assertedly unconstitutional ordinance had caused their exclusion from residence in the
community-i.e., no plaintiff had any property interest in a lowincome housing project that had been barred from the suburb
because of the ordinance. The Court bolstered its conclusion by
noting that no such housing projects were awaiting approval by the
suburb at the time the case was decided. It also observed that
although the zoning ordinances may have increased the cost of
housing, the plaintiffs' inability to find housing in the suburb
might have resulted from the ordinary operation of the housing
market and not from the defendants' allegedly unconstitutional
4
actions. "1
Similar concerns with causation pervaded EKWRO, where indigent plaintiffs who had been denied services at certain taxexempt hospitals challenged a Revenue Ruling which made it
easier for hospitals to reduce their services to indigents while maintaining their status as charitable organizations." 5 The Court held
that the plaintiffs had inadequately alleged the causal link be112

See, e.g., Sloan v. Nixon, 60 F.R.D. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1398 (2d

Cir. 1974).
113422 U.S. 490 (1975).
114
Id. at 506.
15 426 U.S. 26, 29-33 (1976).
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tween the Revenue Ruling and the denial of services, since the
hospitals could have decided to limit services to indigents "without
'16
regard to the tax implications."'
A.

Causationas a Substantive Issue

In both Warth and EKWRO, the Court was concerned about
the effectiveness of any remedy that might have been granted,
since the plaintiffs' injuries, if any, were a product of the marketplace and not of the defendants' conduct.' 17 However, the Court's
constitutionalization of causation is puzzling. If the Court merely
wants a plaintiff to allege clearly the causal link between a defendant's conduct and an ostensible injury, it need not resort to constitutional doctrine. For example, suppose that Smith files a complaint against the Union Pacific Railroad alleging (a) that he had
broken his arm in New York, and (b) that on the same day the
defendant had negligently run through a grade crossing in
California. Smith seeks damages from the railroad. Plainly, this
complaint is properly subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted, since the applicable
substantive law predicates relief on proof of a causal link between
18
injury and negligence.
Thus, a causal connection between wrongful act and injury
may be part of the plaintiff's burden of proof if he is to obtain
relief on the merits.119 One could say that Smith lacked standing to
raise questions about the Union Pacific's operations in California,
but that would needlessly inject constitutional overtones into an
otherwise straightforward analysis of the elements of a tort claim.
The requirement that a plaintiff establish a causal connection involves a substantive policy choice; it is not inconceivable that a
court concerned with railroad safety might some day conclude that
Smith's hypothetical claim showed a sufficient causal connection to
survive a motion to dismiss, but a court reaching that decision
would clearly be changing the substantive law of torts. Smith's
claim is barred not because of any inherent limitation on the power
of the courts, but because of a substantive policy choice about the
degree of causal connection needed to establish a right to recover
in tort.
116 Id. at 43.

117Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-44 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1975).
116 See Albert, supra note 3, at 438-42.
119 See D. CURRIE, supra note 58, at 56. See also Albert, supra note 3.
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The connection between causation and the merits can be seen
in EKWRO. The following scenarios illustrate the range of effects
that the Revenue Ruling might have had on hospitals that qualified
for the disputed tax exemption:
(1) Trustee A: "The cost of providing services to indigents
has skyrocketed, and we haven't been able to attract new
interns and residents. Why don't we eliminate our service
to indigents?"
Trustee B: "But won't we lose our tax exemption?"
Accountant: "I have looked at the figures, and I estimate
that we would save more by eliminating those services
than we would lose in contributions if we were not taxexempt."
(A vote is taken and Trustee A's proposal is adopted.)
Counsel: "Incidentally, I have just learned that, under a
recent Revenue Ruling; the new policy won't endanger
our tax-exempt status."
(2) Trustees A and B as before.
Counsel: "There is a new Revenue Ruling that will permit
us to retain our tax-exempt status even if this new policy
is adopted."
(A vote is taken and Trustee A's proposal is adopted.)
(3) Trustees A and B as before.
Accountant: "I have looked at the figures, and my guess is
that we will lose slightly more than we gain if the new
policy is adopted and we lose our tax exemption."
Counsel: "But there is a new Revenue Ruling that will
permit us to retain our tax-exempt status even if the new
policy is adopted."
Accountant: "In that case, we will be better off if we
adopt the new policy."
(A vote is taken and Trustee A's proposal is adopted.)
(4) Counsel: "Before the meeting starts, I would like to point
out that there is a new Revenue Ruling that will let us
eliminate many of our services to indigents and still retain
our tax exemption."
Trustee A: "Good. We have never made money on that
operation anyway."
(A vote is taken and Trustee A's proposal is adopted.)
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For convenience, these scenarios can be labeled as follows: (1)
"no causation"-a situation analogous to the Smith hypothetical, 1 20 (2) "contributory causation," (3) "causation at the margin,"
and (4) "primary causation." In EKWRO the pleadings alleged
contributory causation, 1 2 1 and the suit should have been dismissed at the pleading stage only if substantive law required some
closer connection between the allegedly illegal Revenue Ruling and
the injury to the plaintiffs.
Although this Article is not concerned with substantive tax law,
the contours of the tax question should be quickly sketched. To
determine if the EKWRO pleadings stated a cause of action, one
would first determine the nature of the tax incentive. If Congress
wished to grant hospitals a clear-cut tax incentive for providing
services to indigents, then the Internal Revenue Service would violate the law if it sought to change the congressional policy by administrative action, 1 22 whether or not the hospitals continued to
provide the services. Thus the injury complained of would not be
the denial of services, but reduction of the incentive that Congress
intended to provide. 1 23 Alternatively, Congress may have wanted
to induce hospitals to provide services that market pressures might
otherwise have led them to deny. In that case, a "contributory
causation" pleading would be inadequate because Congress did not
intend to insulate indigents from all market pressures; a hospital's
decision to terminate its services to indigents while retaining its tax
exemption would be improper only if the tax exemption was the
primary factor in the decision to terminate services. The Revenue
Ruling would frustrate the congressional policy of encouraging
services to indigents only in the clear "but for" case. Thus, a pleading would have to allege "primary causation" or "causation at the
12 4
margin" in order to state a claim on the merits.
In EKWRO, the plaintiffs clearly alleged that the Revenue Ruling "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to indigents. Nevertheless, the Court held that "it does not follow . . .that the denial of
120 The "no causation" case will not be discussed in this section. There analysis pro-

ceeds after determining whether Congress conferred standing in a particular case. See text
accompanying notes 10-112 supra.
121426 U.S. at 33.
122 This was the allegation in EKWRO. Id. at 33.
122 The claimed injury was "to [the plaintiffs'] beneficial interest .... to their 'opportunity and ability' to receive medical services." Id. at 56 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
124The EKWRO Court's analysis of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), indicates that
there too it implicitly determined that a claim of primary causation was required in order
to state a claim. See id. at 504-05.
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access to hospital services in fact results from [the] Ruling,"' 2 5 and
considered it "plausible that the hospitals... would elect to [forego]
favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain
of an increase in the level of uncompensated services.' 2 6 Without
acknowledging that it was ruling on the merits, the Court plainly
held that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a case of "primary"
or "marginal" causation.' 2 7 That may indeed have been the correct
result on the merits, but instead of directly confronting the statutory tax issue, the Court concealed its decision by raising constitutional standing questions.
B.

PleadingCausation
Even if the Court correctly interpreted the tax laws as requiring more than contributory causation, it failed to face the problem
of identifying, at the pleading stage, which scenario the hospital
had followed. Had the Court held that the plaintiffs needed to
show only contributory causation to make out a cognizable claim,
then it could have assumed that, like all economic entities, the
hospital had based its decision in part on the availability of the
challenged tax incentive. Under this assumption, the pleadings
would have adequately alleged contributory causation.
A requirement that the pleadings allege primary or marginal
causation would create serious difficulties for plaintiffs in the position of the EKWRO complainants. The EKWRO plaintiffs probably
had no way of knowing what happened at the meeting of the
trustees; that kind of information could only have been obtained
through discovery. Of course, they could have alleged primary
causation, and left their attorney to worry at night about Rule
11.12s But they also would have faced a second problem if they had
had to establish primary or marginal causation on the face of the
pleadings: the particular hospital at which they were denied services might have done so because of market considerations and not
because of the Ruling. Had they named the wrong hospital, the
lawsuit would have been unnecessarily terminated because there
125426 U.S. at 42.
126 d. at 43.
2M
Id. at 40-44. The Court admitted there might be "speculative" grounds for such a
decision, but held that "respondents' allegation that certain hospitals receive substantial
charitable contributions, without more, does not establish the further proposition that these
hospitals are dependent upon such contributions." Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
128 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The rule states in part: "The signature of an attorney consti-

tutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay."
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must have been a hospital somewhere in the country where the
balance regarding services to the indigents had been tipped by the
Revenue Ruling, as in the third scenario. The market, however,
would have concealed the identity of that hospital. Congress, although regarding causation at the margin as a necessary element
of the claim, might have wished to allow persons who could not
adequately allege causation at the pleading stage-those who could
allege only that the Ruling "encouraged" hospitals to abandon
services-to assert the statutory claim. Thus, once the Court had
vaulted the hurdle of causation by implicitly choosing the stricter
standard, it still should have considered the proper scope of the
statutorily conferred standing to litigate the substantive claim. The
source of this cavalier treatment of questions of substantive statutory law lies in the Court's erroneous effort to constitutionalize the
law of standing.
Because the plaintiffs in EKWRO had structured their claim in
terms of contributory causation and because the Court implicitly
held that primary causation must be proved in order to state a
cognizable claim, it was not necessary for the Court in EKWRO to
decide the degree of specificity required in pleading causation.
However, because the Court did not acknowledge this implied
holding, its decision in EKWRO, and earlier in Warth, required a
degree of specificity in pleadings that is at odds with the general
pleading rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 9 In
EKWRO, for example, the Court criticized the plaintiffs' "unadorned speculation" about the various links in the chain of causation between the Revenue Ruling and the denial of services. Presumably, allegations in a signed complaint would have satisfied the
Court, although statements in briefs would not. But the Court
failed to explain why the complaint had to be dismissed for failure
to prove causation prior to discovery, especially when summary
judgment would have offered an early opportunity for trial court
dismissal of a meritless claim.' 30 That procedure would have given
the plaintiffs an opportunity to use discovery to bolster their claims
of causation from the evidence in the hands of the hospitals affected by the Revenue Ruling.' 3 1 If the plaintiffs had failed to
129 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).
3

'Cf. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.15 (1973). There, the Court observed that plaintiffs must allege that they have been or will be perceptibly harmed by the

challenged action, not that they could imagine circumstances in which they might be affected by such actions. But the Court added that summary judgment, after discovery, was
available to sort out meritorious from frivolous claims.
"I In the discovery process, the plaintiffs would have been forced to use depositions,
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show primary causation after discovery, summary judgment could
have been entered against them on the merits.
The Court's opinions in Warth and EKWRO do not give a
32
principled justification for the special pleading requirements.1
The new pleading rules serve to trap unfortunate plaintiffs and
may alert defendants to new methods of prevailing on the merits.
The Court can now manipulate specificity rules to disguise decisions on the merits while appearing to dispose of cases on preliminary pleading grounds. 33 When drafting a pleading, a plaintiff's
attorney must try to determine whether the Court's views on the
merits of the case are so strong that special pleading rules will be
raised to bar the claim. Attorneys are likely to guess incorrectly in a
fair number of cases, and therefore the special pleading rules are
not only unprincipled in terms of the development of the law of
standing, but are also arbitrary and unjust.
It is possible to justify the Court's special pleading rules by
reconstructing the requirement. If we accept the Court's holdings
that primary causation must be pleaded in certain cases, 34 we can
rationalize the pleading rules as an attempt to rule out the possibility that the ordinary operations of the market economy caused the
injury. This view limits the scope of the Warth-EKWRO pleading
rules to cases in which the underlying complaint asserts that the
challenged governmental action had its primary effect on the poor.
Increased specificity regarding the link between governmental action and injury is one means, but certainly not the best means, to
guarantee that governmental action alone caused an injury.
However, problems remain. Under normal primary causation
rules, a defendant prevails on the merits by proving that something
35
other than the allegedly illegal action contributed to the injury.
which are relatively expensive. Because the hospitals were not parties to the litigation, the
plaintiffs would not have been able to use the less expensive interrogatories. FED. R. Civ.
P. 33; FED. R. Civ. P. 26. See Wirtz v. I.C. Harris & Co., 36 F.R.D. 116 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
1'2 See Note, FederalStanding: 1976, 4 HOESTRA L. REv. 383 (1976); 54 N. CAR. L. REv.
449 (1976). Both commentators treat Warth solely as a pleading case, without noting its
implicit substantive ruling.
13s 422 U.S. at 508 & n.18; 426 U.S. at 44-46.
1'4 Had the Court accepted the contention that on the merits only contributory causation must be alleged, the plaintiffs' pleadings probably would have been sufficient. Given
the economic assumptions of the tax laws, it is likely that tax considerations played some
part in the hospitals' decision to limit services to indigents, and the plaintiffs were in no
better position than the defendants to gather information on the hospitals' decisionmaking
processes.
'3' That is, if the illegal action joins something else to cause the deprivation, the illegal
action is a contributory cause; if the caused deprivation is independent of the allegedly
illegal action, a "no causation" case results. See also Scott, supra note 3, at 651-54.
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Stated in this manner, a claim that the market, rather than the
government, caused an injury looks like an affirmative defense.
But why should the burden of pleading that
the market did not
136
cause an injury be shifted to the plaintiff?
Professor Cleary's classic analysis 137 identifies three standards
relevant to allocating the burden of pleading: probability, fairness,
and policy. This analysis is based on the notion that in a market
society governmental actions alone will rarely prevent consumers
from paying the going price to private suppliers for a service.
Thus, probability considerations argue in favor of placing the burden of pleading the absence of market causes on the plaintiff in
cases where primary causation is required as a matter of substantive law. This shift in the burden of pleading will eliminate a large
number of cases from initial consideration by the courts.
Fairness criteria rest on the relative access of the parties to
crucial information. Prior to discovery, the plaintiffs are unlikely to
have access to materials relating to the internal deliberations of
private suppliers. However, where the defendants are government
officials, as in Warth and EKWRO, perhaps neither party will have
easy access to the necessary information. In addition, given the
infrequency of primary causation situations, those that do occur
are likely to be matters of public knowledge. For example, one
might expect investigative reporters to look into changes in hospital policies adopted soon after the issuance of a favorable Revenue
Ruling.
Finally, policy must be considered. The strict requirement of
primary causation is a response to the skepticism we feel about
identifying single causes for complex events. 138 The allocation of
the burden of pleading in EKWRO ultimately rested on the Court's
judgment that plaintiffs should not be granted relief where governmental action has merely compounded the burdens of indigency. Whatever the validity of that judgment, disguising the policy choice by invoking the standing doctrine does not promote the
rational development of constitutional law. Here, as elsewhere, the
136 At this point, the burden of pleading, not the burden of persuasion, is being considered. It is entirely possible that the defendants would have the burden of pleading that
something other than their action caused the harm to the plaintiffs, while the plaintiffs
would bear the burden of persuasion on the same point.
137 Cleary, Pleading and Presuming: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1959).
138See Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 346-48. The analysis in this Article draws heavily on conversations with Professor Clune.
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law of standing hinders rather than helps our understanding of the
genuine constitutional problems involved.
III
THE PROBLEM OF MISPLACED GENERALIZATION-

Flast v. Cohen

AND ITS PROGENY

Warth and EKWRO involved identifiable injuries to particular
parties. They exemplify the role of constitutional law as incidental
to the determination of private rights. 139 It is possible, although
ultimately unsatisfactory, to ground Congress' power to confer
standing in the "private rights" theory.' 40 Flast v. Cohen,' 4 1 which
allowed a taxpayer to challenge the expenditure of federal funds,
is inconsistent with that theory. It has, however, been the source of
a branch of the law of standing.
Flast established a relatively coherent framework for analyzing
constitutional questions of standing to sue. Unfortunately, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, after clearly setting out the
proper framework, introduced unnecessary embellishments that
42
have weakened the opinion's force and have confused the Court.
In Flast, the Chief Justice drew a.distinction within the general
doctrine of justiciability-between those policies served by the law
of standing and those policies served by the law of political questions.' 43 Justiciability encompasses
two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part
[it] limit[s] the business of the federal courts to questions presented [(I)] in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And
in part [it] define[s] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power [(2)] to assure that the federal courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. 44
139See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1365-68.
140 See text accompanying notes 16-29 supra.
141392 U.S. 83 (1968).
142 Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court suggested that a taxpayer had a private interest because success would reduce his or her tax burden. Id. at 103 n.23. Justice
Harlan's dissent correctly responded that where expenditures are drawn from general revenues, invalidation of a spending program would not result in a decrease in taxes. Id. at
118-19. See also Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1034.
143392 U.S. at 94-101. The opinion also attempted to distinguish between prudential
and constitutional considerations affecting the Court's disposition of questions of standing.
Id. at 101-06. For a discussion .of the revival of that distinction, see text accompanying
notes 191-98 infra.
144 392 U.S. at 95.
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According to Flast, the constitutional doctrine of standing guarantees adverseness; the doctrine of political questions assures the
proper judicial respect for the coordinate branches of government. 1 45 This distinction represents Chief Justice Warren's major
accomplishment in the opinion.
A.

Concrete Adverseness and its Surrogates
The distinction drawn by the Chief Justice should have simplified the process of determining whether a plaintiff has standing; inquiry should focus on the "concrete adverseness" of the
plaintiff's case. Unfortunately, the Flast Court's formulation of the
test for standing added the more complicated requirement that
there be a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated"' 46 and that, in a taxpayer suit, the plaintiff "show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional
taxing and spending power."' 47 The point of the first part of this
requirement is clear. When a nexus between status and claim
exists, we can be relatively "confident that the questions will be
framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be
pursued with the necessary vigor.'

48

The nexus serves as a substi-

tute for the direct personal injury called for by the "private rights"
model of constitutional adjudication.
This analysis, however, leaves open two related questions.
First, it is not clear that the required nexus will guarantee concrete
adverseness. Thus, the Court's attempt to substitute a more particularized test for concrete adverseness might permit a lawsuit
where the policies underlying the case or controversy requirement
would suggest that the suit should not be entertained. Second, the
Flast Court never explained the necessity for an indirect test for
concrete adverseness.1

49

The Flast Court, by establishing a rule to limit standing, 150 may
'45See Note, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 GEo. L.J. 747, 751-52 (1973). In United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), Chief Justice Burger lost sight of this fundamental distinction,
and reintroduced political question considerations into the analysis of a standing matter.
146 392 U.S. at 102.
147M. at 102-03.
148d. at 106,
149 This problem was mentioned by Justice Harlan in dissent. Id. at 121, 124.
Moreover, the Court has more recently been satisfied with direct retrospective examination
of that question. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
151
See 57 ILL. BARJ. 236, 245 (1968).
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have erroneously tried to generalize from the taxpayer cases to
other, as yet unimagined, cases of ideological plaintiffs. 15 1 The
Court's failure to justify its generalized rule sowed the seeds for
subsequent decisions repudiating the fundamentally correct analysis of Flast. Flast itself thus illustrates the dangers of deciding cases
not concretely before the Court.
1. The Implicit Limitations in Flast
Chief Justice Warren twice hinted in Flast that the absence of
other plausible plaintiffs to challenge the government action at
issue justified granting standing to taxpayers. 1 52 He noted that freeexercise claims were distinguishable from establishment-clause
claims, since the former necessarily involved a specially burdened
class of people, and "the proper party emphasis in the federal
standing doctrine would require that standing be limited to the
taxpayers within the affected class."' 153 In formulating the nexus
requirement, the Chief Justice stated that taxpayers could not challenge expenditures incidental to "the administration of an essentially regulatory statute."' 54 In such a case, persons directly affected by the regulation could ordinarily be expected to challenge
its constitutionality. If necessary, they could also assert claims affecting the general public interest in addition to claims based upon
55
the direct burdens imposed on them by the regulation.
If these hints are taken seriously, taxpayers had standing in
Flast because no one else was likely to present the claim for adjudi"' An ideological plaintiff's sole interest in litigating is to vindicate his or her belief
about what is constitutional and what is not, without concern for pocket-book or other
forms of concrete injury.
152 See 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 444, 453-54 (1968).
1 392 U.S. at 104 n.25. justice Harlan, in dissent, responded to this "better plaintiff"
analysis by noting that Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), showed that there
were better plaintiffs than taxpayers to raise challenges to federal expenditures for
church-related schools. 392 U.S. at 125 n.12. In Allen, members of a school board, who
were concerned about a conflict between their oaths of office and the requirement of state
law that they disburse books to church-related schools, were allowed to raise the constitutional challenge. However, the situation in Allen was unusual. Not all school boards are
reluctant to spend money, and most expenditure programs would not involve the participation of officials who might realistically be expected to object. Thus, a finding that no
better plaintiffs exist rests on a realistic estimate of the likelihood that other plaintiffs will
come 54
forward, not on abstract speculation about who might be more directly injured.
1 Id.at 102.
155 Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) (in suit to stay FCC
action, private litigants had standing only as representatives of public interest); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, amended and rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 642
(1940) (financially injured party had standing as "person aggrieved" to challenge FCC
licensing decision).

1977]

THE LAW OF STANDING

cation. A preference for "better" plaintiffs is justified by the selfevident truth that the more directly a person is affected by a governmental regulation, the harder he or she will fight to remove the
restrictions it imposes; i.e., adverseness is likely to be great. In
addition, better plaintiffs allow the court to gauge the actual operation of the statute in question and ensure a fuller factual setting for
deciding constitutional questions.
Conversely, the Court has repeatedly bestowed standing by
default in the absence of better plaintiffs. Moot cases, for example,
are ordinarily nonjusticiable, but the Court has often decided the
merits of otherwise moot cases that are "capable of repetition, yet
evad[e] review.' 156 These cases involve applications of a statute in
concrete situations; 157 therefore, only adverseness need be established.
In contrast, cases raising questions of first amendment overbreadth involve litigants 158 with strong incentives to pursue the
challenge but whose cases do little to illustrate the evil effects of
unconstitutionally overbroad statutes. A defendant may challenge a
statute as overbroad-prohibiting activity protected by the first
amendment-even though his or her activity was plainly not constitutionally protected. 59 The justification for the exception lies in
the deterrent effect of an overbroad statute. Such a statute prohibits constitutionally protected activity. Conscientious citizens,
knowing that the protected activity has been prohibited, will refrain from engaging in it. Thus, cases will seldom arise in which
the state acts to penalize a person whose activity is indeed protected; the only prosecutions will involve those perfectly willing to
break even a clearly constitutional law. However, in vagueness
cases law-abiding citizens may misjudge the scope of a statute,
156Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). The doctrine has
been invoked repeatedly in recent years. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973),
and cases cited therein.
15 Although subsequent events may have nullified the practical significance of the
Court's decision for the parties to the action, the incident that triggered the litigation provided the Court with a representative concrete factual situation illustrating the operation of
the challenged statute.
158Ordinarily these litigants are defendants in criminal cases, but Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), shows that overbreadth claims may sometimes be asserted by
plaintiffs in civil actions.
159Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), which narrowed the circumstances in
which overbreadth challenges might be made by hardcore violators, does not change the
analytical structure of overbreadth standing. The analysis remains valid where censorial
statutes are challenged. These statutes are not facially neutral or evenhanded, but are directed at particular groups or viewpoints. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (teacher loyalty law), involved a censorial statute.
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engage in protected activity, and find themselves prosecuted. 160
Thus, those who engage in constitutionally unprotected activity
should be able to raise overbreadth claims, since plaintiffs engaging
in protected activity are unlikely to feel the force of the law's operation, and state deterrence of constitutionally protected activity
ought to be challenged. But those same individuals should not be
permitted to raise vagueness claims, because of the probable
16 1
availability of better plaintiffs. In fact, this is the state of the law.
The "no better plaintiff" concept stands as an implicit limitation of Flast. Two concluding observations are in order. First, if
Flast suggests that standing should be granted to taxpayers or citizens when no other plaintiffs are available, the opinion does not
assume that all constitutional questions are justiciable. The Court
does not sanction the result feared by Professor Brown-that enactment of a statute would be a mere prelude to challenge of the
statute in the courts.'6 2 Flast clearly preserved other doctrines of
justiciability, notably the political question limitation. 6 3 Relaxed
standing need not, as Professor Brown feared, turn the Supreme
64
Court into a Council of Revision.'
Second, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in United
States v. Richardson 6 5 argued that the absence of a plaintiff other
than a citizen or taxpayer to challenge the failure of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to make its budget public, indicated that
the issue involved a political question. 166 But the Chief Justice's argument departs from traditional political question analysis. The absence of better plaintiffs may suggest that ther!e is a "textually de16 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 854-55,

876-82 (1970). These justifications rest on behavioral assumptions that may fairly be questioned. The law of standing to assert vagueness and overbreadth challenges ought to
change as society changes.
161 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-58 (1974).
162 Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 15-16, quoted in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 n.7 (1974) (concurring
opinion, Powell, J.).
"63 Justice Powell's criticisms of Flast are flawed because he failed to perceive this point.
He criticizes the Court's power to invalidate laws rather than the use of that power. See
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601, 633 (1968); 35 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 94, 98 (1968); 42 TEMIPLE L.Q. 70, 77 (1968); 38 U. CiN. L. REV. 201, 205 (1969).
164 Brown, supra note 162, at 16. Justice Powell also expressed fears over the Supreme
Court acting as a Council of Revision in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189-91 (1974). See also The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 63, 230-31"(1968) (assessing justiciability makes Court resemble Council of Revision). But see Davis, supra note 163, at 634-35.
165 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
166
d. at 179.
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monstrable constitutional commitment"' 6'

of the issue to Congress,

the current test for determining whether a question is political in
the constitutional sense. 168 But the absence of a better plaintiff does
not conclusively determine whether a question is political, as the
Solicitor General recognized in Richardson when he conceded that
even if standing were found, the suit might be barred by the political question doctrine. 169 Perhaps the political question doctrine
ought to be revitalized, but it confuses analysis to use dissatisfaction with the state of the law in one area to justify irrational decisions in another.
2. The Repudiation of Flast
Because Flast substituted an arbitrary nexus requirement for
an inquiry into concrete adverseness, the Court could easily limit
the implications of its holding. For example, when the plaintiff in
Richardson attacked the nondisclosure of the CIA budget rather
than a particular expenditure made by the agency, the Court simply held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the Flast nexus be17
tween his status as a taxpayer and the expenditure challenged.
In a formal sense this was correct, 17 1 but it is inconceivable that the
result would have been different had the plaintiff alleged that CIA
funds had been used to support right-wing Christian fundamentalist publications in violation of the establishment clause, and that
disclosure of the CIA budget was necessary to prove that claim at

trial.

17 2

The Richardson Court rejected the plaintiff's claim to standing
as a citizen. The plaintiff had argued that he could not fulfill his
obligation as a citizen to vote in an informed manner without
167 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-22 (1969).

168 See also The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 194-95 (1975) (difficulty of administering remedy for exclusionary zoning may be one ground justifying judicial reluctance to determine such cases on merits). The difficulty of administering relief
supports, instead, the withholding of relief for want of equity.
169 418 U.S. at 206-07 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
17"Id. at 175. See also Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 216-19 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
171Justice Powell noted the formalistic nature of the Court's analysis. 418 U.S. at 184
(concurring opinion).
172At several points in the opinion, the Court clearly indicated its views on the merits
of the claim presented. Id. at 175 n.7 (reference to other agencies operating under statutes
that conceal budgets). See also id. at 175 n.8 (Congress, although recognizing public's need
for information on government operation, has maintained restraints on disclosure of confidential information); id. at 178 n.l 1 (reference to history of U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7,
as proving that framers did not intend to abolish secrecy absolutely).
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knowing what expenditures Congress had approved for CIA activities. The Court held that citizen standing was unavailable because the plaintiff's grievances were "shared with 'all members of
the public.' "1,'a This simply restates the problem; a party claiming
standing as a citizen presents a claim shared by all members of the
public. According to Flast, courts must inquire into the logical
nexus between citizenship and the claim; the Court in Richardson
17 4
simply refused to make the inquiry. '
In a companion case to Richardson, the Court directly addressed the question of the concreteness necessary to permit informed adjudication. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War'7 5 was a suit by persons, claiming standing as citizens, challenging the enrollment of members of Congress in the Reserves.
Plaintiffs claimed that this practice violated the constitutional prohibition of dual office holding.17 ' The Court held that the claimed
injury, denial of the exercise of independent judgment by the dual
office holders, was insufficiently concrete to permit informed
adjudication. Unfortunately, the Court followed a standard that
disregarded the inherently relative nature of concreteness. If the
factual setting of a plaintiff's claim provides the best possible illumination of the operation of the challenged practice, then the Court
ought to be able to consider the merits of the case. Of course,
finding standing does not mean that the Court must decide the
case in favor of the plaintiffs, or even that it must decide the merits
at all. An amorphous injury may be evidence that the issue is not a
proper one for judicial resolution, but that is a separate inquiry.
The Court's decisions in Richardson and Reservists rested on two
unarticulated assumptions. First, the Court assumed that judicial
inquiry into the constitutionality of a practice may offend coordinate branches of government. Although this assumption might be
defensible if fully articulated, on its face it is odd. It is difficult to
see why Congress and the President should be offended by being
required to defend a lawsuit, particularly when the political question doctrine provides an adequate defense for their actions. The
1,3
Id. at 178, quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
174The Court also demonstrated some confusion in explaining why Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), survived Flast. It suggested that Frothingham survived because
there the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirement of distinguishing herself from the
general populace. 418 U.S. at 172. But in Flast the Court explicitly stated that Frothingham
survived only because the plaintiff did not allege a violation of a specific limitation on the
spending power. 392 U.S. at 105.
175 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
176 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl.
2: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
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second assumption is simpler: the Court was convinced that the
practices challenged in Richardson and Reservists were constitutional,
and it made no sense to let those lawsuits go to trial when they
were doomed to failure. 17 7 But it made little sense to twist the law
of standing to terminate the lawsuits. The Court's duty is to articulate principles of continuing applicability; hostility to the merits of
particular lawsuits is not such a principle.
B.

"Exceeds Specific Limitations"

The second part of the Flast test is pure fiat: no member of the
Court has explained why a taxpayer has standihg only to challenge
expenditures that exceed specific limitations on the spending
power.' 7 8 Perhaps the only explanation lies in a felt necessity to
preserve the result in Frothingham v. Mellon.' 79 There the Court
denied standing to a taxpayer who claimed that a federal expenditure violated the due process clause and invaded a sphere reserved

80
to the states by the tenth amendment.1
Another possible source of the second Flast requirement is
more interesting. The concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and
Fortas in Flast suggested rather strongly that Flast should be understood as an establishment-clause case.' 8 ' They argued, in effect,
that because of its particular history, the establishment clause conferred standing on taxpayers, just as in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, l 2 the fourth amendment conferred standing on
persons whose homes had been searched.18 3 The second Flast
requirement, then, is no more than a misguided attempt to articulate a general standard for determining which constitutional provi-

177 However, in Reservists and EKWRO the merits of the claims were before the Court.
Judicial effort was not saved by refusing to decide the merits in those cases.
178This has been widely noted. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 163, at 605-06; Note, supra
note 145, at 753; Note, Federal Taxpayers and Standing: Flast v. Cohen, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
444, 448-49 (1969); 38 U. CIv. L. REV. 201, 204-05 (1969). For a discussion of difficulties
in determining what provisions of the Constitution are specific limitations on the spending
power, see 42 TEMPLE L.Q. 70, 75-76 (1968).
179262 U.S. 447 (1923).
180 See Scott, supra note 3, at 661-62; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 164, at
224-31; Note, supra note 145, at 753-54.
181392 U.S. at 114 (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.); id. at 115-16 (concurring opinion,
Fortas, J.). Mr. Justice Powell would apparently treat Flast in the same way. See United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (concurring opinion, Powell, J.): "I would
not overrule Flast on its facts, because it is now settled that federal taxpayer standing exists
in Establishment Clause cases." See also The Supreme Court, 1967 Tenn, supra note 164, at
228-29; Note, FederalTaxpayers and Standing:Flast v. Cohen, supra note 178, at 449-53.
182403 U.S. 388 (1971).
183
Id. at 397.
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sions confer standing on taxpayers. The attempt is misguided
because under this analysis standing can be found only after interpretation of each particular constitutional provision. A constitutional provision on its face may not limit the spending power,
but if examined in light of its history, the same provision might
have been designed to limit impliedly Congress' power to spend.
By attempting to generalize about the types of provisions that
would confer standing, the Court in Flast weakened the force of its
analysis.
Justice Stewart's recent foray into the field, in his dissenting
opinion in Richardson, demonstrates the same eagerness to substitute a test which purportedly turns on concreteness, without direct
inquiry into the facts of the case. He too sought to return to the
"private rights" model by distinguishing between affirmative duties
imposed on federal officials by the Constitution and specific prohibitions against federal action. 184 Justice Stewart argued that when
the Constitution imposes a duty, the plaintiff complaining of an
official failure to perform the duty has alleged an infringement of
a private right to benefit from the performance of the affirmative
duty.' 85 For example, a plaintiff may claim that Congress has a
duty to disclose the CIA budget and that it has not done so. He or
she then assumes the same legal position as a person claiming that
the Director of the CIA entered into a contract to provide the
budget, but refused to perform; the constitutional duty is the
analogue to the contract. 86 The analysis of Flast comes into play
87
only when a prohibition is involved.'
Justice Stewart's distinction makes little sense when closely examined. Difficulties arise as soon as we try to decide which constitutional provisions impose affirmative duties and which contain
only prohibitions. For example, Justice Stewart treats the establishment clause as a prohibition, and yet it could easily be characterized as a duty not to use taxpayers' money to support churches.
The negative phrasing of this duty is linguistically and logically
irrelevant. The clause at issue in Richardson provided that "a regular
Statement and Account . . . shall be published from time to
184

418 U.S. at 202-05.

85

18 Id. at 203.
, 6 Id. at 203-04.
187 Id. at 205; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228-29
(1974) (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.). In his discussion in Richardson of the importance
attached to this distinction and its significance to Justice Stewart, Justice Powell did not
recognize the strict bifurcation between duty-analysis and Flast-analysis that Justice Stewart
proposed. 418 U.S. at 185-86 (concurring opinion).
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time.' 8s A duty to publish is equally a duty not to withhold from
publication. One is hard-pressed to imagine why the happenstance
that the Constitution puts it one way rather than the other should
make any legal difference. 18 9 Logically, too, the duty-prohibition
distinction serves none of the underlying policies of the standing
doctrine. 1911
C. PrudentialLimitations on Standing
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart felt compelled to
develop restrictive tests for standing, without explaining the need
for restrictions. Justice Powell has at least articulated his reasons
for desiring a return to limited standing to sue. Unfortunately, his
reasons, which he characterizes as prudential, are not good ones:
where they involve political judgments, the judgments are almost
certainly wrong; where they purport to elaborate a doctrine of
standing, the limitations suggested are universally applicable and
therefore lawlessly discretionary.
According to Justice Powell,
repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the
life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public
confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the
utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other
branches.' 9'
Justice Powell's argument is premised on the flawed assumption
that entertaining a suit automatically leads to the invalidation of
government action. So long as other doctrines of justiciability remain available, finding standing does not entail a head-on confrontation between Congress and the courts. Of course, if the Court
regularly entertained purely political controversies, Justice Powell's
evils might result, but the political question doctrine was designed
to prevent that from occurring. Justice Powell's focus on the
past-on the debates in the Constitutional Convention and on the
'"

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
Justice Powell noted, the clause at issue in Richardson is found in a section that

189 As

generally consists of clear prohibitions and directly follows a negative duty: that no money
be drawn from the Treasury unless lawfully appropriated. 418 U.S. at 187 n.6 (concurring
opinion).
190 1d. at 186.
191 Id. at 188.
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New Deal' 92-misled him. For nearly thirty years, cases decided
after generous application of the standing doctrine have created
little public furor except when federalism questions have been involved, as in the reapportionment and abortion controversies.
Thus, the general prudential concern that Justice Powell expressed
in Richardson was misplaced; of the recent standing cases only
Warth v. Seldin potentially raised federalism concerns, and then
only if the merits were decided with insufficient sensitivity to those
193
concerns.
Justice Powell's specific grounds for restrictive standing are
also inadequate. First, he argues that "unrestrained standing...
would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision," 194 as compared to the rejected Council of Revision. If standing were unrestrained, judicial review of all legislative and executive actions could occur at the whim of taxpayers. Furthermore, the
quality of presentation of suits would vary enormously, and such
adjudication would proceed abstractly.1 9 5 However, given the massive expansion of statutory standing, a development that Justice
Powell does not question, the anomalous cases are those in which
standing is unavailable. Direct application of the test of concrete
adverseness would eliminate these difficulties.
Justice Powell then noted that if the power to grant standing
were "indiscriminately" used, "we may witness efforts by the representative branches drastically to curb its use. 1 9 6 At best, this
comment demonstrates a remarkable political obtuseness. In the
political climate of 1974, Congress probably would not have reacted adversely to a requirement that it disclose the CIA budget.
Indeed, one suspects that many legislators would have been relieved had a court required them to do so.
Finally, Justice Powell thinks that citizen suits would impair the
effectiveness of the courts by diverting limited resources away from
the historic role of alleviating concrete injuries to aggrieved
1 98
parties. 197 Standing thus acts to ration limited judicial resources.
" 2 Id. at 189 n.9, 191.
193 "We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to
effective urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative
authorities." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975).
"' United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 191 (1974) (concurring opinion).
95

1 Id. at 189-91.

1961Id. at 191. Actually, the precise reference is to the power to invalidate legislation,
"[t]he power recognized in Marbury v. Madison." Id. Here again Justice Powell proceeds as if
the power
ofjudicial review and the wisdom of its exercise were the same thing.
19 7
Id.
198

See Scott, supra note 3, at 670-73.
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However, Justice Powell erroneously assumes that a decision in
favor of standing in Richardson and Reservists would have swamped
the courts with litigation. 19 9 Statutory standing is now so broad that
allowing citizen suits would probably not significantly increase the
workload of the courts.
These criticisms of Justice Powell's reasons for denying standing in Richardson relate to a more general and important criticism.
Justice Powell's rationale, if taken seriously, would close the courthouse doors completely. If Richardson threatened congressional retaliation or significant diversion of judicial resources, then any case
in which standing might be in issue would do the same. Justice
Powell never gave any grounds for choosing Richardson and Reservists as cases in which standing should be denied, while allowing
determination of the merits in such cases as Sosna v. Iowa.200 If the
Supreme Court is to develop a rationale to restrict standing, that
rationale must be articulated in general principles responsive to
accurately perceived considerations of prudent behavior. Justice
Powell's position is based on misperception, and, because his prudential concerns are stated in terms too generally applicable, his
position is unacceptable.
CONCLUSION

The new law of standing arises from "concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society."' 20 1 "Properly" takes on a dual meaning: that it is correct to
limit the role of the courts, and that their role must be limited in an
acceptable manner. The Court's recent efforts do not comport with
the latter meaning. The new law of standing rests on mechanisms
of limitation that are insufficiently justified, are arguably inconsistent with doctrines the Court has not purported to question, and
have more than an air of arbitrariness about them.
The central function of standing as a limitation on federal
courts may be gleaned from the Court's strong intimations in
EKWRO that, had it reached the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, it
would have rejected them.20 2 A determination that a plaintiff lacks
standing serves as a surrogate for disposition on the merits. Similarly, the Court may manipulate standing rules to dispose of cases
on the merits, as it did in Sosna. The Court, of course, has not
99 See Davis, supra note 163, at 634.

2 1419 U.S. 393 (1975).
201 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
202 426 U.S. at 42-44.
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admitted that standing serves this function, yet the rationales the
Court has advanced for denying standing would support identical
dispositions based on other doctrines.
Plainly, limiting judicial activity through the use of the standing doctrine is no easy task. Justice Powell has suggested that
the choice is essentially between polar extremes-standing for
everyone, or standing for only some. Although Justice Powell does
not doubt the nature of the chosen few who are to be allowed to
pursue their cause, the Court's decisions tend in the direction of
resuscitating a relatively pure "private rights" approach to standing. Whatever the merits of that approach, it cannot be revived
without wreaking havoc in other areas. For example, the "private
rights" approach is inconsistent with developments in the law of
mootness such as Sosna, and with the traditional recognition of a
congressional power to confer standing.
But if standing is granted to more than the chosen few, must
Justice Powell's other option-standing for everyone-necessarily
follow? There is a third option. Standing would be limited only if
a candid assessment of the plaintiff's ability to present the case
adequately 2 3 and a pragmatic evaluation of the factual concreteness that could be expected led to the conclusion that the necessary
"concrete adverseness" was absent. In addition, a generous law of
standing should be coupled with a reluctance to find standing
where plaintiffs more directly affected by the claimed illegality
might realistically be expected to come forward.2 °4 The final component of this approach would be a revitalized political question
doctrine, which would allow the Court to confront directly the sep2 5
aration-of-powers concerns that underlie its recent efforts. 0
The law of standing has done the state some service; but like
an old soldier, it is time for the doctrine to fade away.
211 See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
204 In Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976), a plurality suggested that the Court
should pragmatically determine whether the persons directly affected by a statute were
likely to challenge it. If these persons would come forward, then third parties would have
no standing to contest the statute, and vice versa. Id. at 2873-75. This is similar to the test
suggested
here.
105 But see Henkin, supra note 79.

